The Somaliland and SSC-Khaatumo Conflict: Escalation, Prisoners, and Claims of Defeat
The Horn of Africa has long been a region marked by complex political and territorial disputes, and the ongoing conflict between Somaliland and the SSC-Khaatumo administration is a stark reminder of these tensions. As of early 2025, the contested regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Ayn (often referred to as SSC) remain a flashpoint between Somaliland, a self-declared independent republic, and SSC-Khaatumo, a regional administration that aligns itself with the Federal Government of Somalia. Recent developments suggest an intensification of hostilities, with reports of prisoner captures by Khatumo forces and claims that Somaliland’s administration has suffered significant losses after initiating attacks.
Background of the Conflict
Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 following the collapse of the central government in Mogadishu, establishing itself as a relatively stable entity with its own government, military, and elections. However, its sovereignty remains unrecognized internationally, and Somalia considers it part of its territory. Within Somaliland’s claimed borders lie the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Ayn, home to the Dhulbahante clan, which has historically resisted Somaliland’s authority.
The SSC-Khaatumo administration emerged as a formal entity in early 2023, following a violent uprising in Las Anod, the administrative capital of Sool. Triggered by the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition figure in December 2022, the conflict escalated into a full-scale war between Somaliland forces and Dhulbahante clan militias, supported by other local groups. By August 2023, Somaliland troops were expelled from Las Anod, retreating to the town of Oog, and SSC-Khaatumo declared itself an interim regional state under Somalia’s federal system. Since then, sporadic clashes have persisted, with both sides vying for control over the disputed territories.
Recent Escalation: The Battle of Buqdharkayn
One of the most recent flare-ups occurred in early March 2025 in Buqdharkayn, a town in the Sool region. According to posts on X and emerging reports, Somaliland forces allegedly launched an attack on SSC-Khaatumo military bases at dawn on March 7, 2025. The assault reportedly aimed to reclaim territory lost in previous engagements. However, SSC-Khaatumo forces claim to have repelled the offensive, inflicting heavy casualties and capturing significant numbers of Somaliland soldiers.
Ibrahim Jama Raygal, SSC-Khaatumo’s Security Minister, stated in an interview with Daljir Media on March 7 that their forces not only repelled the attack but also seized prisoners and combat vehicles. X posts from the same day echo this narrative, with users claiming that the battle site had become a “terrorist graveyard” and that “numberless” prisoners of war (POWs) were being transported to Las Anod. Meanwhile, SSC-Khaatumo’s leadership accused Somaliland of instigating the violence, a sentiment reflected in earlier warnings from figures like Najib Barkhad Warsame, the SSC-Khaatumo Minister of Information, who in August 2024 cautioned Somaliland against further aggression.
Khatumo’s Capture of War Prisoners
The capture of Somaliland soldiers has become a focal point in the conflict’s narrative. In February 2025, following clashes in the Shangeed area, SSC-Khaatumo’s Minister of Information, Najiib Barkhadle, announced the capture of 54 light weapons and several POWs. The recent Buqdharkayn battle appears to have added to this tally, with SSC-Khaatumo parading their gains as evidence of battlefield success. Somaliland, in turn, has historically countered such claims by showcasing its own captured SSC-Khaatumo fighters, as seen after the Shangeed clashes when Somaliland paraded prisoners before the media.
The treatment and fate of these prisoners remain unclear, but they represent a bargaining chip in the ongoing struggle. In December 2024, Crisis Group suggested that negotiations over POW releases could serve as a starting point to de-escalate tensions, though no such talks have materialized as of March 2025. The Dhulbahante clan, central to SSC-Khaatumo, has increasingly distanced itself from Somaliland, further complicating any potential dialogue.
Did Somaliland Lose the War and Start the Attack?
Your mention of hearing that “Somaliland administration lose the war and attack starting there side” aligns with some current sentiments and reports. SSC-Khaatumo and its supporters assert that Somaliland’s military campaigns, including the March 7 Buqdharkayn assault, demonstrate desperation following strategic losses, notably the 2023 retreat from Las Anod. Posts on X from March 8, 2025, claim that Somaliland admitted to losses in Buqdharkayn, a rare acknowledgment that bolsters the narrative of defeat.
Historically, Somaliland has struggled to maintain control over the SSC regions. The 2023 war displaced over 150,000 civilians and saw Somaliland forces pushed back significantly, a setback that undermined its territorial claims. Critics argue that Somaliland’s repeated offensives—like those in Erigabo in December 2024 and now Buqdharkayn—are attempts to reassert dominance after losing ground, suggesting a pattern of initiating attacks from a weakened position. However, Somaliland maintains that SSC-Khaatumo, allegedly backed by Somalia’s federal government and external actors, provokes these conflicts to destabilize its administration, particularly ahead of key events like the November 2024 elections.
Definitive evidence of Somaliland “losing the war” remains elusive due to conflicting claims and limited independent verification. Casualty figures and territorial shifts are often exaggerated by both sides, but the loss of Las Anod and ongoing resistance in Sool suggest that Somaliland’s grip on the SSC regions has weakened considerably.
Broader Implications
The Somaliland-SSC-Khaatumo conflict has ripple effects beyond the immediate battlefield. Ethiopia’s maritime deal with Somaliland in January 2024, which Somalia fiercely opposes, has heightened regional tensions, while SSC-Khaatumo’s alignment with Mogadishu challenges Somaliland’s sovereignty ambitions. The presence of external actors—Turkey, Egypt, and others reportedly arming various factions—further complicates the situation, raising fears of a broader proxy war.
For now, the cycle of violence continues, with prisoner captures and territorial skirmishes fueling mutual distrust. Whether Somaliland can regain its footing or SSC-Khaatumo consolidates its gains remains uncertain, but the human cost is undeniable, and the prospects for peace hinge on dialogue that has yet to materialize.
